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1.1 Background and Motivation 
Chapter l 
Introduction 
Many developed countries around the world have been witnessing (and will continue 
to do so for quite a while) a substantial ·'graying'· of their populations. In the United States, in 
1850, less than 3% of the population was older than 64. Th is fig ure is projected to rise from 
near 13% in 1990 to 20% in 2050. The ratio of people aged 65 or older to those between 
20 and 64 has increased from 0. 14 in 1950 lo 0.2 l in 1997 and will soar to 0.36 by 2030. 
In the European Union, the ratio of people over age 65 to potential workers (age 15 to 64) 
to is projected to increase from 0.25 in 2000 to 0.5 in 2050. All th is suggests that the age 
composition of the labor force is rapidly chl:tnging. In the United States, the med ian age of the 
workforce in the US is expected to be over 40 by 2005 compared to 34.7 in 1979. 1 
Alongside the changing age composition of the labor force and highe r li fe expectancy. 
many countries have experienced sign ificant reductions in labor force participation rates of 
older workers. In the United States in 1900 in 65% of men sixty-five years and o lde r were 
active in the labor fo rce This figure declined to 47% in I 950, 16% in 1993.and less than 3% in 
1999. [n the UK, the proportion of men aged 60-64 in employment hal ved from 1968, when 
80% were employed, to less that 40% at the end of I 990s. ln France, the participation rates 
among males 55 and older have fa llen from 3 l .5 % to 15% s ince 1960. More workers are 
seeking early retirement in the OECD countries. In the United States, the participation rates of 
workers aged 55 to 64 has declined from 95% in 1880 to 82% in 1940 and 67% in I 990. ln 
1 The aging of the population is usually attributed to a decline in fertility rates and an increase in the life 
expectancy. For example, in 1900. people v. ho survived to age 65 could expect to live another 12 years; by 1995 
they could expect to live 17.4 years. 
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many Western Eu ropean countries, on ly 50% of the worke rs aged 55-59 years are still active 
in the labor market, and merely I in 5 in thei r early 60s are active. Virtually no one over 65 is 
in work. 
These demographic changes [and government policies that were introduced in 
response l are creating an unprecedented burden on the current younger generations of working 
individuals. In the United States for example, the dependency ratio ( ratio of the number of SS 
recipients to the number of workers) is steadi ly rising from 0.29 in 1997 to about 0.56 by the 
end of rhe 75- year forecast. The combined assets o f the Old Age, Survivo rs. and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) trust funds a re expected to go below the safety level. a year"s worth of 
benefits. in 2032. In the EU countries, the public pens ion expenditure as a percent of GDP 
was 10.4% in 2000. Thi s is expected to ri se to 13.6% by 2040. In Spain, the public pension 
expenditure as a percent of GDP is projected to grow from 9.4% in 2000 to .17.3 in 2050. 
Output in the UK is estimated to dec rease by 2% and public finances are likely to be reduced 
by between £3 billion and £5 billion a year due to increased joblessness. 
In response to these recent challenges, many countries have introduced a large variety 
o f pe nsion and social securi ty (hereafter, SS) programs. r summarize some important 
features of SS programs that are of relevance in understanding present day labor market 
conditions in OECD countries. First, SS programs have a signifi cant impact on labor market 
behavior.1 Gruber and Wise ( 1999) attribute the aforementioned large decline in labor fo rce 
participation rates by o lder workers to the increasing generosity of public pens ion programs 
around the wo rld, as well as to the provis ion o f both early retirement schemes and long-term 
unemployment insurance programs for o lder workers.3 Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin ( 1999) 
2 There is subsLantial evidence in the labor lilerature showing that social security regulations induce reli remem 
(see Coile and Gruber (2000a), Pechman, Aaron and Taussig ( 1968). Baskin ( 1986), Baskin and Shaven ( 1987) 
and Kotlikoff and Wise ( 1987). See also the extensive survey on empirical results in Atkinson ( 1987). 
3 Costa ( 1998) documenls thal rapidly declining labor force participation rates among men over Lhc age of 65 
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document tha t of the 94 countries for which this information was available, 91 induce workers 
to retire - 74 of them mandme retirement in order to collect ben~fits while the other 17 
encourage retirement through tax and benefit formulas. Co ile and Gruber (2000b) find that in 
the US, "the median male worker faces a small tax on work at ages 55-61 , a near zero tax at 
ages 62-64, and a large tax at ages 65-69.'' 
The majority of SS programs are pay-as-you-go (PA YG) systems which are financed 
with payroll taxes, split between both the employer and employee. SS benefits are generally 
related in some way to the number of years worked (and amount of taxes pa id) . Benefits tend 
to increase with lifetime earnings. In some countries (such as Canada, Denmark, or Sweden), 
the pension has multiple components: a flat payment which is completely unrelated to prior 
earnings (thereby providing a minimum amount of income for the elderly) and a second 
com ponent which is tied to previous earnings. 
The fact that so many public pension programs encourage o lder workers to withdraw 
from the labor market suggests that they are an important vehicle for regulating labor market 
activity. In fact, a popular view about social security, dating back to its early days of inception, 
is that it is a means to transfer jobs from older, employed workers to young, unemployed 
individuals.4 Pres ident Franklin D. Roosevelt, in one of his "fireside chats" suggested that 
this would be an important goal for soc ial security: "The program for social security now 
pend ing before the Congress is a necessary part of the future unemployment policy of the 
Government... It proposes, by means of old-age pensions, to help those who have reached 
the age of retirement to give up their jobs and thus give to the younger generation greater 
was wiinessed well before any form of social insurance program was estab lished. 
·
1 In Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (200 I), I find that although it is possible that policy-induced retirement 
can promote labor market efficiency, most public pension programs pay the elderly substantially more than labor 
market search theory implies that their jobs are worth. 
opportunities for work and to give all a feeling of security as they look toward their old age ... " 
(Roosevelt, pp.134-5). 
Since then, governments have recogn ized that it is a fallacy to think that economies 
simply have a fixed number of jobs that can be divided among their citizens: the so-called 
" lump-of-labor" fallacy. It is 110 longer believed that shedding o lder workers will make more 
room in the economy for younger workers, or that re-emp loying older workers must be at the 
expense of opportunities for younger ones. The lump of labor fallacy ignores the flexib ility of 
wages in the labor market. It assumes that the supply of labor is homogenous i.e., a young 
worker is a perfect substitute for an old worker and therefore has no long-term effect on labor 
demand and fim1 entry. 
Finally, as pointed out by Gruber and Wise ( 1999), many countries have introduced 
a variety of early retirement schemes and long-term unemployment insurance programs that 
allow for older, displaced workers to retire before the normal retirement age. These programs 
are extremely generous, providing as much as 60-70% of previous income and have also 
been introduced to combat unemployment problems facing younger workers. For example, 
in France, the 'contrat de solidarite" recognized the '·double need to encourage 55-59 
year-old workers to stop work and bring young workers into the labor market, as ri sing youth 
unemployment was a growing concern to society as a whole." Furthermore, a precondition 
to receiving unemployment benefits for people over the age of 55 is that they stop " seeking 
employment". 5 
Recent evidence suggests that an individual's age has important implications for their 
labor market experiences. Fi rst, the unemployment rate of younger workers is higher than 
that of older workers. For example, in 1987, the unemployment rate for male workers under 
5 For more details, see the OECD ( 1995) study on "The Labor Market and Older Workers", Gruber and Wise 
(1999), and the discussion in Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (2001 ). 
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the age of25 in the US was 12.6% compared to 4.8% for those over the age of25. ln France 
during the same period . the unemployment rate for younger workers was 19.6%. but only 
6.4% fo r older workers. Second, the incidence of long-tenn unemployment is much higher for 
older workers. Jn the United States in 1996, while the inc idence of long-term unemployment 
for the overall labor force ( 15 to 64 years) was on ly 9.3%, this number rises to 14.6% for o lder 
workers (between the ages of 45 and 64). In France. the incidence of long-term unemployment 
among the entire workforce is much higher (39 .5%); that for workers between the ages of 45 
and 64 is as high as 62.0%. 
Furthermore, older workers who experience involuntary job loss are more likely to 
become permanently separated from their employers. O'Leary and Wandner (2000) find that 
while less than I 0% of displaced workers under the age of 55 permanently exit the labor force, 
more than 25% of workers between the ages of 55 and 64 and almost half of workers over the 
age of 65 opt fo r retirement instead o f searching for alternative sources of employment upon 
displacement. Additionally. as discussed in Jacobson et. al. ( 1993), upon finding employment 
displaced workers receive wages that are about 25% lower than in their previous job. 
There are many explanations for why older workers find it harder to find jobs. An 
important explanation due to Oi ( 1962) and further advanced by Hutchens ( 1986), is that the 
initiation of an employment rel::itionship requires firms to incur fixed costs thereby increas ing 
the incentive to hire younger workers. It may also be true that fim1s choose not to hire older 
workers because they are relatively less productive.6 
A quick summary of the above discussion is in order. First, in a lmost all countries, 
the labor force is getting older. Secondly, labor force participation rates of older workers 
6 Jn a two-period overlapping generations model, Pissarides ( 1992) considers the impact of lost productivity for 
older workers resulting from long-term unemployment. Laing, Palivos, and Wang (200 I), in a model with vintage 
human capital, assume that workers born in later periods will be less productive than newly-born workers due to 
economic growth. 
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have been steadily declining during the post-war period. Thirdly, many public policies affect 
the labor market participation decision of older workers in that rhey encourage retirement. 
Fourthly, an individual"s age plays a significant role in derermining their labor market status. 
Young workers are more likely to be unemployed (but not for long); older workers who lose 
their jobs are more likely to remain unemployed fo r a long period of time. Many older workers 
may become discouraged about the prospects of j ob search and choose to retire. Those who 
find new jobs will earn less than in their previous positions. 
1.2 Relevant Literature 
Two dominant (and fairly divergent) approaches to modelling the labor market are to 
be fo und in the literature. The Walrasian paradigm endows workers and finns with perfect 
information about the labor market conditions; in particular every worker is assumed to 
know the wage offered by each finn in the economy. At the other extreme is the search 
paradigm. which generally assumes that job-seeking workers interact with the finn s in a labor 
market characterized by equilibrium unemployment. The two basic features of the Walrasian 
approach are full employment and equal it) beC\\een ''ages and the marginal product of labor. 
earch models, on the other hand. al low for frictional unemployment and typical ly yield 
wages below the marginal product of labor. earch frictions break the link between marginal 
product and wages, and introduce rent-sharing between workers and finns. 
The above review of the current demographic trends strongly suggests that to 
understand the implications of these trends on the aggregate labor market, a model with 
equi librium unemployment is imperative. Diamond ( 1982), Mortensen ( 1982), and Pissarides 
(I 990) analyzed unemployment in a match ing framework. These models postulate the 
existence of n matching function that maps measu res of unemployment and vacancies into a 
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measure of matches. A match pairs a worker and a fi nn who then have to bargain on how to 
share the match surplus. The outcome of the matching framework is in general not efficient. 
There are either too many or too few vacancies posted in equilibrium. Therefore these 
models, apart from incorporati ng frictional unemployment, address the general equi librium 
consequences of congestion in the labor market and its effect on unemployment and wages 
through the process of bargaining. The search model has been used extensively in the literature 
to understand the implications of job heterogeneity. Acemoglu ( 1997), Berto la and Caballero 
( 1994). and Davis ( 1995) explore the matching models where the heterogeneity on the job 
supply side is negotiated through a single matching function. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) 
investigate a labor market in which workers di ffer in their abi lities and jobs differ in their skill 
requirements. This addresses the issues of differences in skills across workers and di fferences 
in skill requirements. The existing literature with equilibrium unemployment main ly focuses 
on the heterogeneities in the labor market via skill differences. 
The effect of age and a worker's position on the life-cycle has strong effects on an 
individual"s labor market participation as discussed in the review above. Bhattacharya and 
Reed (200 I )7 is an early attempt at fonna lizing some of these issues. The life-cycle of workers 
explicit in their overlapping-generations setup in conjunction with the search frictions in their 
labor market form ulation produces a rich environment in which both young and old workers 
may fi nd themselves contemporaneously competing for the same jobs. It is this meeting of 
the young and the old in the labor market that produces interesting consequences for both 
the age groups at the indiv idual level. B&R also attempt to capture the general equi librium 
effects of these individual- level consequences by exploring policies that affect the labor-force 
participation decision of workers, and through th is channel , firm entry. 
7 Hence forth re ferred to as B&R. 
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This thesis essemially starts off where B&R left. ln particular, it is designed to 
addresses one major lacuna in the B&R paper. In their setup. policies that induce the old 
with jobs to retire would be unambi guo usly disastrous for the economy, and here's why. 
The ir life-cycle model differentiates between a young and an old worker by recognizing each 
worker's position o n the life-cycle. A young worker [who has two periods left to live] can be 
matched with a firm for two periods while an o ld worker [who has onl y one period le ft to live] 
can at most be matched with a firm for one period. Inducing the o ld with j obs to retire would 
therefore equate job durability over different points in the life-cycle thereby undennin ing the 
entire focus of the model. In short. the B&R model is il l-suited to study retirement by o ld 
people who have jobs. 
A study of the labor market most often addresses the issue of retirement. Retirement 
is at times referred to as the "golden age" and the "leisure years". The French call it "The 
Third Age" or the age of living (which follows the ages of learnin g and worki ng). Given the 
Ii fe-cyc le frame-work, where the young and the o ld interact in the la bor market to search for 
jobs. a distinction between the old workers is essential to mode l retirement. This distinction 
between the old workers enables policy to target that group o f old workers who have some 
option o uts ide the labor market. Leisure seems to be a natu ral choice as people who prefer 
lei sure are more likely to withdraw from the labor market. Recent trends in the labor market 
indicate that an increasing number of retirees are citing a pre ference for leisure as their main 
motivation for leaving the labor force. Costa documents that among the men who retired at 
age 65, in 1941-1951 only 3% gave le isure to be their reason fo r retiring. This number rose to 
17% in 1963 and 48% in 1982. 
Retirement is a period of Ii fe that is anticipated and enjoyed by most who leave the 
work force. When retiring people alv.ays fee l, "We have served our ti me; now we deserve to 
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do some things that we have put off'. It comt!s as no surprise that a genronotologist reported 
that .. In their fifties many men feel an urgency to do things that their occupational lives had 
made it difficult" '. This suggests that prelcrence for leisu re almost comes as a shock towards 
the end of an indiv iduals work life and motivates workers to leave the work force. Therefore, 
in this study. a worker"s p:-cft:rence for leisu re (high/low) is revealed at the end of the first 
period and before the beginning of the second period. 
Moreover, Costa documents that expenditure elasticities of recreational goods has 
fallen from more than two at the beginning of the century to slightly more than one today 
(earlier a luxury but now more or less nonnal good) Expenditure elasticities have fallen due 
to two reasons: technological change that has lowered the price of recreation and increase 
in the public provision of goods that are complementary to recreationa l goods. This implies 
that recreation is now attractive and inexpensive and that decreases in income through policy 
intervention may not lead to substantial increases in labor force participation. 
In addition, there is a heightened concern for displaced workers. The frequency of job 
loss among workers over the age of 50 has risen disproportionately in recent years. Farber 
( 1996) shows that the three-year probability of job loss among workers 55 and over rose 
from 11 % in 1981 to more than 16% in 1993. Between 1981 and 1993, workers 55 to 64 
experienced the largest increase in job loss probabilities for any age group. The economic 
impact for these workers is potential ly quite severe as o lder workers typically have high 
pre-displacement job tenure and are much less likely than younger workers to be re-employed. 
The Congressional Budget Office ( 1993) finds that workers aged 55 to 69 are more than twice 
as likely to be out of the labor force following a job loss than younger workers. Among 
workers over 60 years old . more than half have left the labor force fol lowing a job Joss. Chan 
and tevens ( 1999) find that a job loss at age 50 or above has substantial and long-lasting 
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employment effects, and that these effects vary with age at which job loss occurs. Displaced 
workers in their 50s are estimated to have a three quarter chance of returning to work within 
two years after a job loss, whereas for a 62-year-old job loser, the probability is less than a 
third . 
B&R address the issue of job separation in their model but fail to distinguish the old 
separated workers from the old never-before employed workers. A match between a young 
worker and a firm can dissolve after the end of the first period. The old workers who were 
matched in the previous period are the separated workers. These workers re-enter the labor 
market in search fo r jobs. B&R at this point do not dist inguish between an old separated 
worker and an old never-before employed workers. Therefore. these hvo workers draw equal 
wages in the labor market inspite of differing in their employment histories. ln this study, 
these two types of old workers are differentiated through the hiring costs incurred by the firms. 
The cost of hiring an old separated worker is lower that of the never-before employed worker. 
This implies that the training acquired by the separated worker in his previous job is in some 
way transferable. Therefore, these two workers in this model draw different wages in the labor 
market. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The principal aim of this research is to build a dynamic general equilibrium model 
to study the implications of inter-generationa l confl icts on labor market. An overlapping 
generations model with fin itely-lived agents explicitl y separates workers based on their 
position in the life-cycle. Moreover, the old workers are differentiated not on ly on the basis 
of thei r em ployment histories but also through their preference for leisure. A fract ion o of 
old agents get utility from leisure while the remainder do not care about leisure at al l. It is 
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assumed that the uti lity fo r the low le isure type equals zero. The intens ity of worker preference 
for leisure is revealed to a worker at the end o f the first period of life. The preference for 
le isure. when old, affects a worker's wage bargaining with the firm both when young and 
when old since it directly affects the ir threat points. 8. Thus in the labor market, at any po int 
in time, there are workers w ith seven different possible histories: the young, the old employed 
(with unbroken matches from the previous period) with a high/low leisure preference, the old 
who got separated from their previous match with a hi gh/low le isure preference, and the old 
never-before employed with a high/low leisure preference. 
In additio n, the labor market in the real world is characterized by unemployment. 
This aspect is captured by model ling the labor market in a search and matching framework. 
There are two agents in the market, workers and firms. Both agents spend resources 
before job creation and production takes place. The two agents are brought together via a 
matching techno logy. The matching technology is a function of the total number of workers 
seeking employment and tota l number of firms seeking employees. Therefore, an addi tional 
unemployed worker reduces the probabil ity of a worker getting matched with a firm but 
increases the probability of a firm getti ng matched with a worke r. The trading externality is 
a key feature of the search and matching models. Given the li fe-cycle model, a match with 
a young worker is durable for a maximum of two periods. A match with an old worker can 
survive o nly one period. The durability of a match has implications for the profits accruing to 
a firm . For example if a match is durable for two periods, then the firm has to incur search and 
hiring costs after two periods. But if the match is du rable only for one period, then the firm 
8 Pissarides (200 I) introduces a notion of leisure in his discussion of labor market participat ion. In his analysis, 
he assumes that all workers receive some benefi ts from leisure, but the value of leisure varies across individuals. 
In contrast to his analysis, I model that the benefits of leisure may accrue over the course of the Jifecycle and 
therefore will affect the retirement decisions of older workers. I also show how these add itional aspects of aging 
affect aggregate labor market behavior through their interactions with wages at each stage of the cycle and vacancy 
creation. 
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has Lo incur these costs in the second period itself. The total surplus from a match is equally 
shared between the rwo agents. Nash Bargaining determines the equilibrium wages. 
Using this set-up. Chapter 2 characterizes in detail the '"Baseline Case". Here all the 
seven workers participate in the labor market. Given the pattern of labor market participation, 
the main aim of the Basel inc case is to unravel the interactions between the young and old 
workers when workers are differentiated through their position in the life-cycle and their 
preference for leisure. In addition. this set-up would enable comparison with the Baseline case 
o f B&R. This, in tum would explicitly indicate the effect on the labor marker of introducing 
heterogeneity among the older workers through differing employment histories and leisure 
preference. Chapter 2 describes the steady state equilibrium, discusses a numerical benchmark 
example and compares the results to that of B&R and further investigates the effect of some 
exogenous variables on the aggregate labor market and welfare. 
Chapter 3 characterizes the "True-Retirement'' Case. Here the old employed workers 
wi th high preference for leisure withdraw from the labor market. Therefore, at any point 
in time, there are six types of workers actively participating in the labor market. This case 
highlights the effect on the labor market of the withdrawal of workers that are currently 
employed but have an option outside the market. It is this group of workers that are the focus 
of various labor market policies. An analys is of this case therefore. gives us useful insights 
because the withdrawal is voluntary and not policy induced. Chapter 3 further compares 
the outcome of the True Retirement case with the Baseline case and discusses the welfare 
implications. 
Chapter 4 discusses the main findings or the model and concludes the study. 
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Chapter 2 
Baseline Case 
This chapter describes the mode l in general and focuses mainly on the Baseline case. 
In this case al l the seven different types of workers active ly participate in the labor market. 
Given the pattern of labor market participation, the Base line case focuses on the impact of 
life-cycle of workers and their preference for leisure on the aggregate labor market. Later in 
thi s chapter, the results of a benchmark numerical experiment are compared to B&R in order 
to high I ight the differences in the two models and their outcomes on the labor market. 
2.1 E nvironment 
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of two-period lived overlapping 
generations. It is populated by a continuum of two types of agents, workers and finns. These 
agents are risk neutral. There is no growth in the population sizes of these agents. Workers 
live o nly for two periods. Consequently. in any period, there are two types of workers - young 
and o ld. Each generation of workers is of equal measure. 1· so that the total population of 
workers is eq ual to 1 in each period. At birth , all workers are unemployed. There are no assets 
or saving instruments. All income earned is consumed in the same period. Towards the end 
of the first period o f life, workers are subject to a two-state idiosyncratic leisure shock which 
determines for them their relat ive preference for leisure in the second period of their lives. 
Technologica lly identical firms of a s ingle industry produce a homogenous consumption 
good each period us ing labor as the factor o f production in a partial-equ ilibrium framework. 
Production is the result of a pa ir-wise matching between one worker and a firm. Trade in 
the labor market is a decentrali zed economic activity. lt is uncoordinated, time consum ing 
a nd cost ly for both agents. The agents do not coordinate the ir activities but instead behave as 
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individual competitors. Both agents spend resources before job creation and production takes 
place. This trade is non-trivial if there arc heterogeneities and frictions in the labor market. In 
my model, there are two main sources of heterogeneity: pos ition in the life-cycle (i.e., age) 
and o ld-age preference for leisure. All agents share the same discount factor {3. In the model, 
a pair-wise random matching process between firms and workers (of all ages) and a bargaining 
process detennine the wages of the workers and net revenue of the firms. 
Matches between a finn and a worker potentially lase two periods if the worker is young 
when recruited. If an old worker is hired, then the firm will have to incur hiring and other costs 
the following period. Thus Lhe life-cycle o f agents has implications for j ob durability and on 
the total surplus created. B&R identified a source o f inefficiency here: young people with two 
periods to live may remain unemployed even when the old with one period to live may get 
hired. My model extends the ir analysis by identifying yet another source of inefficiency. Old 
workers with jobs with a high preference for leisure may co-exist alongside young workers 
with no jobs and no desire for leisure. Put stark ly, there are o ld workers who have jobs but 
who would rather not work [and hence have to be compensated for working]. and then there 
are workers who would ra ther work but are unemployed. 
2.2 Timeline 
This section describes the basic features o f the model and the sequence of events that 
occur in the labor market. Lett be the time index. The labor market opens at the beginning of 
each period. The unemployed workers, young and old, choose whether to search for vacancies 
or not. When a worker, young or old, decides to search, he incurs an upfront costs. If finns 
decide to enter the market to search for employees, then they incur an upfront cost a. Prior to 
the opening of the labor market. old workers have knowledge about their leisure preference. 
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The firms know the probability distribution with which an o ld worker can be of high or low 
le isure type and given this in fonnation they decide to enter the labor market based on their 
expected profits. The finns cannot discriminate between workers based on either their age or 
the ir preference for leisure. 
Let Ut (Fv,t) denote the total mass of unemployed workers (unfilled vacancies) at 
the start of date t. Unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies are brought together via a 
stochastic matching process. Any unemployed worker faces the probability ac of getting 
matched with an unfilled vacancy in period t. A finn faces the probabi lity B, of locating a 
worker. At the end of any period, the match formed at the start of the period may dissolve 
with an exogenously given probabi lity b. A match, therefore survives for a minimum length of 
one period and a maximum length of two periods. The probability of meeting a g iven type of 
worker (young or old), will depend on the participation o f each type (uy ,t or Us,t or uo,t ) . The 
probability of finding a young unemployed worker is B/uyi, where Uyt that equals~ , is the 
ratio of young unemployed workers to the total mass o f unemployed comprising of the young, 
o ld separated and never-before employed old. Similarly, the probabil ity of meeting an old 
separated worker is Bt'fist,where iist = V, and the probability of meeting an old never-before 
employed worker is 0(tL0 t,where Uot = 1~; ' . 
Tn the equ il ibrium of the baseline case, at the start of any date t, both young and o ld 
workers participate in the labor market. All the you ng are unemployed. The old workers fall 
under three different employment histories: employed, separated and never-before employed. 
The employed o ld are the workers who did not get separated from their previous job, the 
separated a re the workers who got separated with an exogenously given probabil ity and the 
never-before employed are the workers who did not get matched when young. Therefore, at 
the start of date t , an old wo rker is employed with probability at-l (1 - b) , separated but 
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employed v.hen young with probability fl t- ib and never-before employed with probability 
1 - O't- l · Apart from different employment histories. the old workers are further differentiated 
by their preference for leisure . An old worker can have a high (low) preference for leisure 
with an exogenously given probabil ity 6 (1 - 6). Consequently, at any date t there are seven 
types of workers in the economy. 
Once a match is formed and job creation takes place, production occurs. Let p denote 
the exogenously determined market value of the firm·s output. Matches with new hires (young 
or never-before employed old) require the firm to incur the cost of training h so the net output 
is (p - h) . while matches with an old separated worker require it to incur a lower cost of 
training h~ so the net output is (p - h $) and the net output of a firm with a retained worker is p. 
Comparing the net surplus between a match with a new hire vis-a-vis a separated old worker 
indicates that the surplus to a firm is more when it gets matched with a separated worker. 
Therefore, employment hi stories have an impact on the profitabi li ty of firms and the labor 
market rewards workers with previous experience. This assumes that skil ls are transferable 
across firms. 
Any match formation potentially creates a surplus for both the agents, workers and 
firms. It is assumed that the total surplus is equally shared by both the agents. 
2.3 Worker's Payoff 
Workers constitute the labor supply and are the only input used in the production 
process. Their deci sions to enter the labor market is based on their ex-ante expected uti lities. 
Let l1i (l1) be the utility that a worker with high (low) preference drives from leisure. Let 
Jyt be the expected lifetime utility of a young worker if he chooses to seek employment and 
Wy1 be the ·wage paid to a young worker in period t. Let Jg] (.J:,t) be the expected lifetime 
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utili ty of an old worker with high (low) preference fo r leisure who begins period t employed 
at a firm and w~~ ( w~'.t) be the wage paid. Let 1;; ( .J;~t) denote the expected lifetime utility 
of an o ld worker with high (low) preference fo r leisure who was employed when young but 
got separated and begins period t unemployed and w~'.~ (w~'.t) be the wage paid. Finally, let 
.J:,~ (J::,~) denote the exi;ected lifetime ut ili ty of an old worker with high (low) preference for 
leisure who was unemployed when young and w~.~ (w:,t) be the wage paid. The fo llowing 
value functions govern the expected present discounted surplus of workers in each state: 
+,Bb{ 8 (max( .J:.~+l • lh)) + (1 - 6) (max( .J~~t+ 1, Li))} I 
+ (1 - at ) B{ 6 ( ma."'<(J:~+ i .lh)) + ( 1 - 6) ( max(~+1 , l1 ))} 
Je" = weh 
o, t o,l (2.2) 
When a young worker seeks employment he must incur a search cost of s. With 
probabil ity O.t, he gets matched and earns a wage Wyt . In the fol lowing period (t + 1), he may 
be sti ll matched with the same fi rm with probability b. Depending on his preference for leisure 
that is revea led before the beginning of the second period, he faces the choice of retaining 
the job or exi ting the labor market to enjoy leisure. ff instead the match dissolves after the 
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first period with probability (1 - b), the worker re-enters the labor market in period (t + 1) 
as a separated worker after evaluating his expected utility from search versus leisure. With 
probability (1 - a,). the young worker docs not get matched when young and is unemployed 
at the start oft+ 1 He chooses to seek employment if the expected utility from seeking 
work exceeds the utility from leisure. The workers decision to enter the labor market to seek 
employment in the second period is made prior to the opening of the market. In addition. an 
o ld worker is of high (low) leisure type with probability 8 (1 - 8) and this too is revealed to 
the worker prior to the opening of the labor market. 
In the Baseline case, under the assumption that all the workers participate in the labor 
market, the fo llowing inequalities are imposed on the model : J11t > (3 (8lh + [l - 8] l1), 
with low preference fo r leisure do not derive any utility from lei sure. i.e., l1 = 0. Rewriting 
the above equation (2.1 ) after substituting equation (2.2) in the steady state gives 
.J11 = -s + a[w11 + 6 (1 - b) {ow~" + (1 - 8) w!1} 
+f3b{ 6 ( - s + <xw!h -l- { 1 - a) lh) ,. ( L - 6) ( -s + a:w!1) } ] 
The total mass of unemployed workers in the Baseline case is U, = u 11,t + us,t ,. u0 ,t, where 
11.y,, is the young unemployed that is 4 by assumption, u~.t is the separated unemployed 
and Uo,t and is the unemployed old. In the steady state, us = ~b , u0 = 1; 0 and 
U = 4 + ~b + 1 ;a = 2-o~t-b) and hence the fraction of each type of unemployed in the total 
I d I t' . - - i - ob d - i -o unemp oye popu a ion is 1;,; = i - o:{l - b) , 1L,, = 2_ 0 ( t -b) an Uo = '.l-o:{ l - b). 
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2.4 Firm's Payoff 
The production technology exhibits constant returns to sca le with labor as the only 
input. Each firm employs at most one worker. Therefore, a firm can be matched with either a 
young or an old worker. Production precedes matching and each employed worker produces p 
units of output. Firms begin each period in one of the two possible states. They have a vacancy 
or they are matched from the previous period with an old worker and will have a vacancy for 
sure the fo llowing period. Let "v.i be the expected lifetime profits of a firm that has an unfilled 
vacancy and rr),i (7r~,,) be the expected lifetime profits o f a firm that is matched with an old 
worker with high (low) preference for leisure. The firm knows the probabi lity with which an 
old worker can be of high or low leisure type. The following Bellman equations describe the 
expected discounted profits of a firm in each state: 
71' v,t = -a + Btilyt[ (p - h - Wyt) + {3b71' u,t+l (2.3) 
+!3 {l _ b){8 ( 7r1.c+1 if 1i.7+'. > Lh ) + (l _ 8) ( 7T'~.i+i if 1:,t+'. > l1 ) }] 
7T' v,t+ I Otherwise 71' v,t+ l Otherwise 
( 
(P - hs - W~~) if 1:~ > lh ) ( (p - h 8 - W05 1. ) if 1051t > l1 ) +Biust[c5 
0 
' ' + (1 - c5) •• · 
otherwise 0 otherwise 
+{37r u,t+iJ 
( 
(p h wuh) 
e _ [>. - - o,t -!.. t1lot U 
0 
if 1:;7 > th ) ( (P - h - w:;'c) ' + (1- 8) ' 
otherwise O 
if 1~ > l1 ) 
otherwise 
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h ( ch) {3 7r f .t = p - Wo ,t I 7r v,t i-1 (2.4) 
I ( t•I ) fJ 
7r f.t = P - Wo,L + 7r u,t+I 
When a firm posts a vacancy. it incurs a cost a. With probability Btiiyt · it gets matched with 
a young worker and earns a net revenue of (p - h - w11,). The finn will have a vacancy the 
fo ll owing period with probability b. ifthe match disso lves. With probabi lity (1 - b), the match 
does not dissolve. Depending on the worker's preference for leisure. the worker may either 
work or withdraw there fore implying that the firm will have a fl lied vacancy or a vacancy 
respectively in the following period. If the firm has a filled vacancy. the expected discounted 
profits are ?r,,t+i ( rr~,t+i) with probability 6 (( l - 6)) . With probability Btil~t • the finn gets 
matched with a separated worker and earns a net revenue of (p - hs - w~1) with probabi lity 
6 and (p - hs - w~'.t) with probability (l - 8). The firm then has an unfilled vacancy for sure 
in the next period. The firm gets matched with a worker who was unemployed in the previous 
period with probability Btiiot and earns a net revenue o f (p - h - w~~ ) with probabi lity 6 and 
(p - h - w~~1 ) \.\ith probab il ity (1 - 8). The firm has an unfilled vacancy in the following 
period. [n period t if the firm does not get matched with probability (1 - B,), then it will have 
an unfilled vacancy in the following period. Firms that begin a period with a filled vacancy 
do not incur any hiring costs and their net revenues are p - weht or p - we't depending on o, o , 
workers' leisure preference. These firms will have an unfi lled vacancy in the fo llowing period. 
Note that the expected profits of a fi nn depend on the employment histories of the workers 
::ind their preference fo r leisure. 
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Focussing on the Baseline case in the stead_v state where all the workers choose to seek 
employment, equation (2.3) can be re-written after substituting equation (2.4) as 
1rv = l - euy,8 (b + f3 [l - b]) ~ eusf3 - Buof3 - (1 - 0) f3 {-a+ e·uy[(p - h - Wy) 
+(3 {1 - b) {8 (p - w:i) + (1 - 6) (p - w~1)} ] 
+Bils[b (p - h3 - W~h) + (1 - 6) (p - h5 - w~')J 
+eu0 [6 (P - h - w~h) + (1 - 6) (p - h - w~')]} 
Let F, be the total number of existing firms at the start of date t. Let F u,t denote the 
tota l number of firms with an unfilled vacancy at the sta1t of date t. and F1i be the total 
number of firms with a filled vacancy at the start of date l. If the fi rm has a vacancy at 
t, it can find itself in one of three possib le situations at t + 1. First, a) it does not find 
a worker at t and hence it wi ll have a vacancy at t + 1. orb) it finds a young worker 
this period; this worker gets separated with probability bi in which case the firm will 
have a vacancy the next period. or the worker does not get separated with probability 
(1 - bt) in which case it will not have a vacancy at t + 1, or c) it finds an old worker this 
period in which case the firm wi ll definitely have a vacancy at t + 1. Then it fo llows that 
and accounting restrictions require that F1.t + Fv,t = Ft. In the steady slate in the Baseline 
Case, the number of firms in the two states are Fu=~ [2 - a (1 - b)]; F1 = 0 <12-b) and thus 
the total number of firms is given by F = ~ [2-0~1 -bJ + (1 - b) J . 
2.5 Ma tching 
Workers enter the labor market to seek employment and the firms with unfil led 
vacancies enter to seek employees. Prior to production. the firms and workers are brought 
together via the matching technology. The match ing technology descri bes the total number of 
matches, mt = µJ\f ([;1• Fu.i). that arc formed at the beginning of each period. lt is a function 
of the aggregate number of workers look ing for a job and the number of firms looking for 
workers. Since O:t represents the probabi lity that an unemployed worker will find a vacancy 
in period t and Bi is the probabi li ty that an unfilled vacancy will find an unemployed worker. 
it fo llows that the total number of workers who find employment ( ai.Ut ) must equa l the total 
num ber of firms that filled their vacancies (Bt.Fv,t) : 
It is important to note that a 1 and Bt are determined in equilibrium, and that both workers 
and firms take them as given when making thei r decisions to participate in the labor market. 
The ratio between workers and firms. q = lif , is commonly called the tightness of the labor 
market. Note that mt = Bi.Fv,t and this gives the fo llowing equalities: 
The matching technology is assumed to be the Cobb-Douglas. f n the steady state 
m(U, F~,) = µ(U)"'(Fu) l- i? where 9 E [O, 1). This implies that the probability that a fi rm gets 
matched with a worker is O(q) = µ (q)-<t> and the probability that a worker gets matched with 
a firm is o:(q) = O(q)q. The tighter the market is, the lower is the probability ofa firm getting 
matched with a worker. The matching function is increasing in both its arguments, concave 
and homogenous of degree I. An increase in either the number of unemployed workers or 
unfilled vacancies increases the number of matches each period, but at a decreasing rate. The 
extent of lubrication in the labor market is given by µ > O; ceteris paribus, more matches 
occur when µ is higher. Note that the matching function also exh ibits constant elasticities 
arn(U, F,.) u I q 
aU m(U, Fv) = -e (q) B(q) = ¢ 
2J 
Thus </> is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the measure of 
unemployment and the negative of the elasticity of the probability that a firm finds a worker 
with respect to the tightness of labor marker. Therefore a high Q implies that an additional 
vacancy has a larger negative impact on all firms' probability of getting matched and therefore 
filling their vacancy. A high ? would also imply that an additional worker will have a larger 
positive impact on all firms probabili ty of filling their vacancy. 
2.6 Bargaining and Wage Determination 
The friction built into the job-firm matching process creates the possibility that a firm 
may remain unproductive or a worker may remain unemployed in any period. Firms and 
workers must therefore weigh the implications of finding themselves in these states and their 
outside options when bargaining over their share of current and future surp lus produced. ln 
this set-up. the total surplus created (when a firm is matched with a worker) will depend on the 
worker's age, employment histol), and preference for leisure. 
Young worker 
A young worker seeks employment and with probability a he gets matched with a 
firm. Let W y t be the wage he gets in the first period. In the fo llowing period, with probability 
(1 - b) the match does not di ssolve and the worker remains employed with the same firm. 
Cf the worker decides to work instead of enjoying leisure. his expected utility is f38 J;h or 
/3 (1 - 8) 1; 1 depending on his leisure preference. If the match dissolves with probability 
bat the end of the first period, the worker re-enters the labor market if his expected utility 
(/38 .Ji" or /3 (l - 6) J;1) from seeking employment exceeds the utility from leisure. If instead 
the young worker does not find employment and re-enters the labor market in the fo llowing 
period, his expected discounted utility would be /36J;:11 or {3 (l - 8) J:;' depending on his 
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leisure preference. Thus, a young worker's surplus from finding employment in period t is 
given by the fol lowing equation. 
Wyt + 6 ( 1 - b) { 6 (max ( J;:t+ 1 , lh )) + ( 1 - 6) (Ji~t+ 1)} 
For a firm, the su rplus in the first period from hiring a young worker is the output net of the 
hiring and wage costs. If the worker is separated then the firm has a vacancy the next period 
and its expected discounted profits in period t are {3rr u,t+ l · If the worker is not separated and 
decides to work, then it earns expected discounted profi ts of {3frrrJ,t+ i or {3 (1 - 8) 7r?,c+i in 
period t. lf the worker is not separated but decides not to work, then it has a vacancy the next 
period. If the firm would not have found a worker in period t, it wou ld earn expected profits 
of /37rv,t+ l as of period t. Thus the gains from trade accruing to a firm from hiring a young 
worker in period t is given by 
(p - h - Wye)+ p/nrl',t+l 
( 
~,t+l if J:.7+1 > lh ) I 
+{3 (1 - b){ b . + (1 - o) 7T f ,t+ l} - {31r u,t+ l 
7r v,c+ l otherwise 
Given that the match between a young worker and a firm results in surplus, this total surplus 
is shared equally between the two agents. This implies that: 
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Wyt + {3 (I - b) { 8 ( rnn.x(J::~+ 1 . l1J) + (1 - 8) ( J:~,+ 1)} + {Jb{ 8 ( ma."< (.l::~+I • lh)) (2.5) 
+ (1 - 0) (Ji:t+I)} - {3{8 (max(J~'.~~+1 1 fh)) + (1 - 8) (i:~+l)} 
( 
h 
'Tr /,t+l 
= (p- h - Wyt) + {3b7iv.t+l + {J( l - b) {c5 
1Tv.t+l 
if J~~;+ ~ > Lh ) + (1 - c5) rrj,t+L} 
otherwise 
- /3rrv,t+l 
In the Baseline Case, the wage for a young worker in the steady state is therefore: 
(p- h) 1 
Wy = " + 2 (/3 (1 - b) (8rr?+ (1- c5) rrj)) - f37Tv (1- b) (1 - /3) 
-~ (fJ (1 - b) (8J:h + (1- c5) J:)) - ~ (.6b (8J:h + (1- 8) J:1)) 
+~ (/3 ( 8.J;h + ( 1 - c5) J;:t)) 
Employed old worker 
An employed old worker is the one for whom the match from the last period is 
intact. In the Baseline case. the employed worker prefers to work instead of enjoying leisure. 
Therefore, the surplus of an employed worker is merely the wages net of the utility from 
leisure that he forgoes in order to work and is given by (w~1~ - Lh ) and w~1t . For the finn 
' ' 
depending on whether the worker is of high or low le isure type, the surp lus is given by 
(p - w~~ + /31T v,t+L - {31T v,t+1) and (p - w~'.t + {37r",t+1 - {37r v,t+I) . Bargaining with equal 
weights implies that the aggregate surplus is equally shared between the agents. Hence the 
wages for the emp.loyed worker with high and low preference for leisure in the steady state are 
w~" = P~1'' and w~1 = ~ respectively. Firms matched with workers from the previous period 
do not incur any search and hiring costs. This affects the total surplus from the match and in 
turn affects the wages earned by the o ld employed workers. 
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Separated old worker 
A separated worker is the one who was matched \: ith a firm \: hen young but the 
match dissolved at the end of the first period. I !is preference for leisure is revealed before 
he re-enters the market in search for a job. His surplus from employment in the Baseline 
Case, based on his leisure preference is either ( w~'.~ - l1i) or w~'. t . The finn when matched 
with a separated worker has to incur hiring costs in addition to the search cost. The cost of 
hiri ng a separated worker is lower compared to new hires, young and never-before employed 
\:vorkers. The surplus. based on different leisure preferences of the worker, is the value 
o utput net of the hiring and wage costs and is given by(p - /t4 - w~~ + f37Tu,t+ 1 - 87Tu.t+ 1)or 
(p - hs - w~'.t + /3rru, t-J.-l - f3rru,t+i)- Nash Bargaining with equa l weights implies that the 
wages of the two types of separated workers in the sleady swte are w~h = p-h2-1h and 
w~1 = e-;_h· . Here due to the j ob destruction after one period o f employment, both agents incur 
sea rch costs in add ition to the hiring costs incurred by the firms. T his translates into lower 
surplus for both workers compared to the employed worker case. 
Unemployed old worker 
The never-before employed worker entered the labor market when young but was not 
matched with a firm. He re-enters the labor market in the following period . The worker's 
pre ference for le isure is revealed before he enters the market in the second period of his li fe. 
The surplus enjoyed by the two types of workers if they get matched with a finn are given by 
(w~.7- Lh) and w~.1t· For the firm. a match with either a high or low leisure type of a never-
before employed worker results in the fo llowing surplus:(p - h- w~.7 + f37ru ,t+i - f37Tu,t+ 1)or 
(p - h - w~.1, + /37r11.t~1 - f3 ;r l'.t+ l ) . The wages of the two workers in the steady state are 
w"" = e-h+ lb and w"' = ~ 
o 2 a 1 
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Therefore, a comparison of the wages of all the o ld workers indicates the importance of 
employment histories and leisure preference in the determination of the total surplus accruing 
from a match . The wages for an old worker. employed, separated or never-before employed, 
are independent o f the endogenous variables. o and B, and depend on the market value of 
the firms output. the hiring costs and the utility from leisure. Di fTerences in the hiring costs 
are due to different employment histories. For example, a firm does not have to incur any 
hiring costs when it is matched with an old employed worker from the last period. A match 
with a separated worker reduces the surplus of a firm as they have to incur hiring costs and 
this reduces the wage of a separated worker relative to an employed worker. A match with a 
never-before employed worker further reduces the surplus for the firm as the cost of hiring 
a separated worker is less than hiring a never-be fore employed worker. Different leisure 
preferences among the old workers in turn affects the bargaining power of workers. An old 
worker with high preference for le isure has to be compensated in order for them to give up 
leisure to work. Therefore, leisure preferences further differentiate the workers that have the 
same employment history. 
2.7 Stationary Equilibria 
This section describes the steady state equ ilibrium for the Baseline case. The aggregate 
equi li brium state is one where firms and workers maximize their respective objective functions 
subject to the matching technology. In the steady state, there is no population growth 
and the young and old workers are of equal measure. Therefore, the flow of workers into 
unemployment equals the fl ow of workers out of unemployment. 
Definition J A steady -state equilibrium of the Baseline case with free entty in the labor 
market consists of wage functions w;, w~h-.. , w~1 .. . w~"· , w~1 · , w~h· , w~1· , exogenously specified 
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bargaining we(ghls ( ~)for the ll'Orker and the firm. and a quadruple ( 0. - I e·' u·. F: ) satisfying 
the following condi1ions: (i) Nash bargaining; (ii) Unrestricted enfly for firms: 7r~ = O; and 
(iii) Steady-State: a·.u· = e· .F: = µM(U· , F: ). The equilibrium in this case requires 
additional restrictions that ensure that all the agents participate in the labor market i.e., 1; > 
The teady-State Ma tching Conditi on 
The matching condition for the economy is given by: 
where <PE [O , 1). Noting that 1[¥- = ~, the s1eady state matching condition can be written as: 
(2.6) 
Note that the steady-state matching condition implicitly defines a relationship between a and 
e consistent with the steady-state values for U and Fu. 1l1e dependence of a and e on the 
relative number of unemployed workers and firms with vacancies indicates the presence of 
trading externalities. An additional hiring firm makes workers seeking employment better off 
as it increases the probabili ty of getting matched with a firm . but it makes other hiring firms 
worse off as it decreases the probabi lity of a firm getting marched wi th a worker. The same is 
true for workers. An additional worker seeking employment makes hiring firms better off but 
other searching workers worse off. Thus the SS locus is downward sloping (Figure 2). 
T he Equi librium Entry Condition 
Firms choose to enter the k1bor market in order to search for an employee and continue 
to do so until all profit opportunities from new jobs are driven to zero. Thus the equilibrium 
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entry condition implies 
+!3 (1 - b) {c5 (p- w~h) + (1 - c5) (p - w~1) } ] 
+Bus[c5 (P - hs - W~h) + (1 - o) (p - h s - w~1 ) ] 
+euo[o (p - h - w~" ) + (1 - o) (p - h - w~) l 
(2.7) 
Recall that the wages for all the o ld workers are w~h = P~1" , w~1 = ~ . w~h = p-h~+Lh, 
Ul.sl = p- h. w uh = p-h+Lh wul = P=.!:, " . Substituting these wag:es in equation (2 .7) gives the 0 2 • 0 2 '0 :.. ~ ~ . 
fo llowing equilibrium entry condition 
a = Buy[(p - h - Wy) + (3 (1- b) ~] + Bus[p ~ h .• ] 
+eu0 [P ; h] - o~h [Biiy/3 (1 - b) +Bus+ Bua] 
where the wage for a young workers under the equilibrium condition that 1rv = 0 is 
(2.8) 
Wy = (p; h) + ~ (f3(1-b) (c57i~ + (l - 0) 7i~)) - ~ (JJ( l - b) (oJ:h + (1- c5) J:1)) 
(2.9) 
Nash Bargaining with equal weights implies that the surplus is equa lly shared between the 
two agents. The surplus in the first period from hiring a young worker is (p - h) and it is 
equally shared be tween the two agents. If the match stays intact after the first period, the 
young worker gets his share of the expected discounted profi ts (!3 (1 - b) ( 011'? + (1 - 8) Ti~)) 
of the firm accruing in the second period. If a young worker gets matched with a firm, 
then in the fo llowing period he can be in the following tvvo states: employed or separated. 
Therefore, the firm extracts from a young worker it's share of the gains in expected 
utility acc ruing to the young worker in the fo llowing period if the match stays intact 
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(4 (/3 (1- b) (oJih + (1 - c5) J~1))) or di ssolves (& (f3b (c5J~h + (1 - c5) .Ji1))) . If instead 
the young worker does not find employment and re-enters the labor ma rket in the fo llowing 
period, his share of the expected discounted utility would be ~/3 (c5.J~•h + (1 - c5) Jf) . 
Rewriting equation (2.9) after substituting for the expected profits and expected utilities gives 
the fo llowing equati on fo r the wages o f a young worker 
w = (p- h) _ f3s( l-b) _ (3(l-b) 8l1r. [a] 
y 2 2 2 2 
(2. 10) 
-~ (/3ba ( p ~ hs)) + ~ ((3a ( P ; h)) 
Ceteris paribus, a higher search cost (s higher) is associated with lower wages to the young 
because it lowers their option va lue (threat point) of waiting to find employment in the future. 
In other words, it makes the current job offer more attractive. T he firm therefore takes it share 
of the surplus it creates for the worker by offering them this job. Inc rease in the hiring costs 
of new hires (h increases) lowers the wages of the young worker because it decreases the 
expected profits of the finn which in turn lowers the total surplus from a match with new hires. 
A hi gher cost of hiring a separated worker (hs increases) is associated with higher wages. This 
is because the firm compensates the young worker for the future loss of income. An increase 
in the utility from le isure (lh increases), implies that the expected profits o f the firms wi ll 
decline as the high types of workers would require greater compensation to participate in the 
labor market. This adversely affects the wages of the young worker. Finally, an increase in 
probability of being high le isure type (c5 increases) decreases the expected profits of the finns 
as a larger fraction of the population would require hi gher compensation to participate in the 
market. This lowers the total surplus from a match with a young worker and therefore lowers 
his wage. 
Substituting equation (2.1 0) and the expressions for the fraction of each type of 
unemployed in eq uation (2.7), the closed fo rm expression fo r the equi librium entry condition 
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is 
cc · = 2 (p-h)+,B(l-b)(s+p-6l1i)-6l1i -~ (2. ll ) 
(1 + ~) { (p- h- 6lh) - b(p- hs - blh)} - ~~ (1- b) 
Cetrius paribus, an increase in the probability with which a firm finds an unemployed worker 
(0 higher) increases the expected profits of post ing a vacancy. This in turn encourages 
firm entry which increases the probabil ity of a worker find in& employment (a increases). 
Therefore, the EE locus is upward sloping (Figure 2). 
2.8 Numerical Experiments in the Baseline Model 
This section illustrates a benchmark example for the Baseline Case given a set of 
parameters. The results of this benchmark example are compared to that of B&R, highlighting 
the differences between the two and the impact of these differences on the labor market. 
Exam ple 1 The parameter:. ef the economy are as follows: (3 = 0.9 , s = 0.05, a = 0.2, 
µ = 0.4, <P = 0.5, b = 0.3, p = 1, h = 0.3, hs = 0.21, 6 = 0.2 and l1i = 0.3. Then, it can 
be easily checked that equations (2.6) and (2.11) have a unique and economically meaningful 
solution given by (a·, e·) = (0.400, 0.400). At 1his equilibrium, w; = 0.372, w~h· = 0.65, 
el• 0 5 s h• 0 -45 sl• 0 3n5 uh• 0 5 ul• Q 3"' 1* 0 32 1 J""• 0 6-W0 = . , w0 = .0 · , w0 = . :.1 , 1u0 = . , w0 = . o, , u = . -t, 0 = . :>, 
J el• - 0 - j -'h• - 0 348 JSI• - Q 108 JUh• - Q 33Q JUI* - 0 090 - .. - 0 '"81 - . - 0 070 o - .;:>. o - · 1 o - · • o - ·• ' o - · ' Uy - .\:> , Us - · , 
ii~= 0.349, F~ = 0.860, Fj = 0.140, P = 0.999 
Prior to the comparison of the results of the benchmark example to that of B&R, I 
highlight here the aspects of this mode l that di ff er from that of B&R. The set of parameters 
used here are identical to theirs. I lowever. in this model, the separated workers are modelled 
explicitly unlike B&R where the unemployed and separated are combined together. Here the 
dist inction is made through hiring cots. The firms have to incur lower hiring costs (h > hs) 
when they are matched with a separated worker. The old workers apart from having different 
employment histories. a lso d ifTer based on their preference for le isu re. A worker with a 
particular employment history is further classified as being high or low leisure type. There fore, 
th is implies that the results o f B&R can be retrieved from this model by setting h = hs 8 = 0 
and lh = 0. 
Table l gives the results of the benchmark example. Comparing the results of the 
benchmark example of the Baseline case to that o f B&R. it can be seen that here the probab ili ty 
with which a worker gets matched with a finn decreases (a· lower) and the probability with 
which a firm gets matched with a worker increases ((r higher). This is because in this model. 
the bargaining power o f the old workers increases. The o ld workers with high preference for 
le isure have an optio n outs ide the labor market. This requi res the firms to pay these workers 
higher wages in order to compensate them for the loss in le isure due to working. There fore in 
equilibrium there are fewer firms as compared to B&R. This in turn decreases the probabi lity 
with which a worker gets matched with a firm. The total number of unemployed workers is 
also higher compared to B&R. Consequently. the labor market is tighter vis-a-vis B&R. Lower 
hiring costs for the separated workers trans lates into higher wages for the separated workers. 
The wages of a ll the workers except the young, is atleast as high as in the B&R model. The 
wages of a you ng worker are adverse ly affected by the increase in the bargaining power of the 
worker in the fo llowing period, i.e.,when o ld. 
Given the set of parameters of the benchmark example, it would be insightful to see the 
effect on the aggregate labor market of varying each parameter in iso lation. The comparative 
resu lts are in Table 2. 
For given wages, a higher probability of bei ng high le isure type (8 increases) means 
that a larger fraction of the o ld have high preference for le isure. This directly affects the 
profi tability of firms and therefore reduces the number o f firms that enter the market to post 
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vacancies. For a worker, the probability of getting matc hed decreases ca· lower). For the 
finns. the probability of gening matched with a worker increases ce· highe r). The wages of 
the young worker decrease. Th is is because, with greater probability the young worker will 
have a higher bargaining power when old. 
An increase in the utili ty from leisure (hi gher l1i) has the same impact on the 
probabi I ities of getting matched. Here, the wages of al I the high leisure type workers increase 
due co the increased compensation for the loss in leisure . 
An increase in the hiring costs of the new hires (h higher) decreases the expected profits 
of the firms. Fewer firms enter the marker resulting in the same impact on the probabi lities as 
the earlier two cases. The wages of the new hires, young workers and never-before employed 
old workers decrease. The firm earns lowers profits when matched with these workers and this 
attributes to the decline in wages o f these workers. 
An increase in the hiring costs of the separated workers (h igher hs) results in lower 
a: and higher fJ. The wages of lhe separated workers decrease and that of young workers 
increase. The fi nn compensates the young worker for this future loss of income. 
2.9 Measure of Welfare 
The workers here differ in their employment histories and preference for leisure. 
The expected Ii fetim e uti I ity of a representative young worker ly. is the summation of the 
expected utili ty of the worker in each possible state. Thus, .ly is used for measuring social 
we lfare. ln the benchmark example .J; = 0.324. The we lfare is higher here compared to B&R 
where ) 11 = 0.29 . Welfare. as measured by J; is higher compared to B&R, even though 
the probabil ity with which a worker gets matched with a firm (a:" ) and the wage earned by 
a young worker Cw;) are lowering this case compared to B&R. This is due to two reasons. 
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Firstly, the separated workers earn higher wages due to lower hiring costs. Secondly the wages 
of the never-before employed and employed old workers is atleast as high as in B&R. 1l1is 
effect dominates resulting in increased welfare. 
Table 3 gives the results of the change in welfare when each parameter is varied in 
isolation and compares the welfare change wi1h B&R. 
Comparing the welfare change, it can be seen that the direction of change in welfare 
is that same in the two models. An increase in either the probability that a match disso lves 
after o ne period, or the cost of search for a fim1 or the cost of search for a worker. decreases 
welfare. This is because for the first two cases the profits of a firm decrease and the latter is 
due to a decrease in the expected uti I ity of the worker. 
Tab le 4 highlights the change in welfare as result of a change in the utility derived from 
leisure (lh) or the probability of being high leisure type (8). 
Welfare increases in both cases, an increase in the utility from leisure or an increase 
in the probability of being the high leisure type. The probability that a worker gets matched 
with a firm decreases in either case. This is offset by an increase in utility from leisure or an 
increase in the probability of getting high utility from leisure. 
Therefore, the Baseline case. where the pattern of labor market participation was such 
that all the seven types of worker parti cipated in the labor market, indicates the following 
effects on the labor market. Firstly, an increase in the bargaining power of old workers through 
their preference for leisure adversely effects the labor market by lowering firm 's profits and in 
tum decreasing the number of firms that participate in the labor market. Secondly. disp laced 
workers earn lower wages than the employed old workers but higher than the never-before 
employed workers, indicating that employment history has an effect on the wages that the 
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workers draw in equilibrium. Thirdly, old workers with high preference for leisure are 
compensated for their loss in leisure in order for them to supply labor. 
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Chapter 3 
True Retirement Case 
Jn the Baseline case, discussed in the previous chapter, al l the seven types of workers 
participated in the labor market. The following model differed in two ways from the B&R 
model. Here the cost of hiring a separated worker is lower than the hiring cost of the old 
never-before employed workers. Intuitively the work experience acqu ired by the separated 
workers w hen young enables them to be re-employed the following period with less amou nt 
of train ing. In addition, old workers have a preference over leisure. Therefore, the Basel ine 
case apart from addressing the inter-generationa l conflicts of the labor market, deals with the 
aggregate effects of leisure on the labor market. The results of the benchmark example of 
the baseline case, relative to B&R indicate that in this case the labor market is tighter and 
therefore the probability with which a worker gets matched with a fim1 is lower. This is 
because in th e baseline case, the trading externalities existent in B&R have been exacerbated. 
l11e additional heterogeneities among the older workers increase the trad ing externalities. 
Here all seven types of workers are matched by a single matching technology. The matching 
of the workers with the finns is followed by Nash Bargaining. The Nash bargaining process is 
therefore unable to internalize the trading externa lities. The preference over leisure increases 
the bargaining power of older workers and fi rms have to compensate the workers for the loss 
in leisure in order for them to supply labor. This erodes the profits of firms and thus fewer 
firms enter the labor market to search for workers. Therefore, the base! ine case suggests that 
when all the jobs have the same productivity, workers differ in the ir employment histories 
and leisure preference and the search intensity is fixed, the critical variable that drives the 
equ il ibrium is job creation, wh ich is determined by the profit maximizing firms. 
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Reti rement commonly implies withdrawal from the labor market. complete or partia l, 
of the old agents who are cu rrently employed. Currently employed workers will be motivated 
to withdraw from the labor market if they have some option outside the labor market. Leisure 
seems to be an important motivation for leaving the work-force. Recent trends in the labor 
market indicate that an increasing num ber of reti rees are ~iting a preference for leisure as their 
main motivation for leaving the labor force. Costa documents that among the men who retired 
at age 65, in 1941-1951 only 3% gave leisure to be their reason for retiring. This number rose 
to 17% in 1963 and 48% in 1982. 
Old workers are also induced to withdraw from the labor market through various 
government policies. Economists have attributed the decline in the labor market participation 
of older workers to the generosity of the public pension programs. 
In this chapter we focus on the old employed workers and ask this hypothetical 
question: What would be the effect on the labor market if the old employed workers with an 
outside option withdraw from the labor market? Recal l that one of the limitations of the B&R 
model was that it was unable to capture this group of old employed >vorkers. In this chapter 
we study the genera l equilibrium consequences of the voluntary withdrawal of employed old 
workers with high preference for leisure from the labor market. The withdrawal is not induced 
and is not an outcome of any public policy. 
3.1 Model 
In the baseline case, the pattern of labor market participation was such that all the seven 
types of workers actively participated in the labor market. Here the old employed workers 
with high preference for leisure withdraw from the work force. Therefore, the workers who 
were employed when young and their match stays intact in the second period, choose not to 
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supply labor in the market but instead enjoy leisure if they have high preference for leisure . 
The gains from staying out of the labor market need nor necessarily exceed the gains from 
actively participating. Also, these workers who voluntary withdraw from the labor market, do 
not constitute the mass of unemployed workers. 
Given this, the pattern of labor market participation in th is case implies that 
.J., > {3 (8th + [1 - 6J l1), J~1 > l1, J; 11 > l1t, 1: 1 > 11, .J~'h > lh and Jul > Li. Therefore, a 
v orker"s payoff in each state is given by 
- (1 - n) f3{o.r:h - (1 - o) J;;'} 
J('h - l • Q - h 
.J;1 = -S + Cl'.W~I ~ (1 - a) l1 
~1 = - · ~ n w~1 + ( 1 - n) l1 
Note that here the expected lifetime util ity of an old worker with high preference for leisure 
(J;h) is merely the utility he derives from leisure. In the baseline case, this was equal to the 
wages that the worker drew in the labor market. Therefore, a young worker's expected lifetime 
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utility from working simplifies to 
(3 .1) 
+,6b{o (-s + a:w~h + (1 - a) lh) + (1 - o) (- s + aw~1)}] 
+ (1 - Ct) .6 { c5 (-s +aw~" + (1 - a) l1i) + (1 - o) ( - s + aw~1 )} 
Holding a, () and wages constant, the difference in the expected lifetime utility of a young 
worker in the Baseline case and the True Retirement case is a,6 (1 - b) {j ( w~h - lh) . The 
expected li fetime utility of a young worker is lower in the True Retirement case vis-a-vis the 
basel ine case if w~h > lh. This is because an old worker would be better off supplying labor 
in the market if the wages he drew were higher than the utility he received from leisure. It is 
assumed that the workers withdraw from the market even when w~h > li. 
The total mass of unemployed workers in the True Retirement case is U, 
+ h - l I I I t - ab - ! - Ct d u - 2-a(l-b) 'l.l.y.t Us,t + u 0 ,t w ere Uy,t - :i". n tie steaey sta e, 11.9 - 2 , u 0 - 2 an - 2 
.Therefore, ily = 2-a(\-bJ , ·u5 = 2_0(~-bl and ii.0 = 2_~(:._w The fraction of each type of 
unemployed worker in the total mass o f unemployed in the True Retirement case is identical 
to the Baseline case. In the model, the old employed workers enter the labor market only when 
young and at the beginning of the second period, they are a lready matched w ith a firm from 
the previous period. Therefore, the withdrawal of these workers does not affect the mass of 
unemployed workers. 
The firm's problem is identical to the Base line case except that here 7r1 = ,61fv. At the 
end of the first period, (1 - b) fraction of the matches stay intact. The old workers' preference 
fo r leisure is revealed at the end of the first period and before the begi nning of the second 
period. In the Base line case, firms matched with a worker at the end of the first period had a 
fill ed vacancy in the second period because all the workers participated in the labor market 
irrespective of their leisure preference. In the True Retirement case, firms matched with old 
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workers with high preference for le isure have a vacancy in the second period because the 
workers w ithd raw from the market. In the second period, these firms have to search for new 
hires and thus incur search and hiring costs. The expected discounted profits in the True 
Retirement case are 
1 
1fo = 1- Bii.y/3(b+ (1 -b){8 + (l -c5),B}) -BusfJ- Gii.0 {3- (1 - B)f3{-a <
3
·
2
) 
+Biiy[(p - h - wy) + /3 (1 - b) {(l - c5) (p - w':}) }] 
Holding a, e and wages constant, the expected profits in the True Rettrement case are lower 
compared to the baseline case. This is because, 8 fract ion of the finns matched with workers 
from the previous period now have an unfilled vacancy. Therefore, these firms have to incur 
search costs and if they get matched with a new hire, they have to incur h iring costs. Therefore 
the expected profits of a fi rm decline compared to the baseline case. 
The fl ow of vacancies for a firm into period t+l is given by Fv,t+i = F1,t+(l - B) Fv,t+ 
(}fly ,tbFv,t + Buy,t (1 - b) c5Fv,t + 0 (ii.s,t + u0 ,t) Fv,t where F1,t+1 = (}uy,t (1 - b) (1 - c5) Fv,t · 
Accounting restrictions require that F1,i + Fv.l =Ft. In the steady state the masses of fi rms 
are: F = a( l-bJ(l-c5) + ~ [2 - a (1 - b)]; Fv = ~ [2 - a (1 - b)J; F1 = a{l-bJ(l-c5). The 
number o f firms w ith filled vacancies in the True Retirement case is (1 - c5) times the Baseline 
case. This is because in the True Retirement case, c5 fraction of the old employed workers, 
workers with high preference for leisure, withdraw from the market. The firms with which 
they were matched no longer have a filled vacancy. Therefore in this case, for given a and B 
there will be fewer firms with filled vacancies and hence fewer total number of firms in the 
labor market. 
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The matching technology is the same as before. Recall that the matching technology 
is a function of the aggregate num ber of workers looking for a job and the number of 
firms looking for workers. Tn the True Retirement case. the expected profits of finns are 
lower compared to the Base line case. This imp lies that in equilibrium fewer firms will post 
vacancies. Therefore, one wouid expect the probability with which a worker gets matched 
with a firm to be lower in the True Retirement case as fc•..ver firms participate in the labor 
market. 
ash bargaining process with equa l weights determines the wage functions for all the 
workers. The wages of all the old workers are identical to the baseline case and are given 
by •uet = e wsh = e- h.,+th w 81 = e-h, w"1t = p-h+th and w"1 = e=.!! This is because 
'0 2 ' 0 2 ' 0 1. ' 0 '..! 0 2 . 
in the True Retirement case, the withdrawal of the old employed workers with high leisure 
preference leaves the total match surplus of the remaining old workers and the firms matched 
wi th these workers unaltered. The wage functions for the old workers are independent of the 
endogenous variables (a and (}) and are a function of the market value of the firms output, the 
hiring costs and the utility from leisure which are exogenously given. 
Jn the True Retirement case, the surplus accruing to both agents from a match with a 
young worker is di fferent from the baseline case. The surplus accruing to a young worker 
from seeking employment diffe rs in the second period. Instead of working when the match 
stays intact, the worker withdraws from the labor market in the second period if he happens to 
be the high leisure type. The expected lifetime utili ty of an old employed with high preference 
for le isure is merely the utility that he drives from leisure, i.e .. J;h = l1t . In the baseline case, 
J~h = w~i. because the worker chose to work instead of enjoying leisure. For the firm, if the 
match stays intact with probability (1 - b). it will have a vacancy the following period if the 
old employed worker has high preference for leisure. Nash bargaining with equal weights 
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implies that the total match surplus is equally shared between the two agents. Referring back 
to equation (2.5), in the True Retirement case Nash bargaining implies 
wu + f3 (1 - b) {6Lh + (1 - b) w~1 } + {Jb{o (-s +aw~"+ (1 - a) lh) 
+ ( 1 - 6) ( -s + aw~1)} - f3 { 6 ( -.s + ccw~lt + ( 1 - a) l1i) + ( 1 - 6) ( - s + a w~1)} 
= (p - h - w11 ) + ,Bbr.v + /3 (1- b){61rv + (1- b) (p - w~1 + ,(hrv)} - /31rv 
The wage function for a young worker is therefore 
(p -h) 1 f3s (l-b) 
w11 = ? - ? (,Brrv (1 - b) (1- {6 + (1 -8),3} )) - ? (3.3) - - -
-/3(1 -b)
6
; (~)-~ (eba (p~h3 )) .~ (ea (p;h)) 
Hold ing a constant, the di fference between the wage of a young worker in the baseline 
case and the True Retirement case is given by (1 - /3) ( 7r~R - 7r~) - 7r~Rc5 (1 - /3). Recall 
that ( rr~R - 7r!) < O and hence ( w: -w;·n ) < 0. Therefore, a young worker's wage is lower 
in the True Retirement case compared to the Baseline case. A decrease in the job durability 
due to withdrawal of old employed workers with high preference for leisure adversely affects 
the profits of the firms which in turn lowers the wages earned by young workers. 
3.2 ta tionary eq uilibria 
De finition 2 A steady -state equilibrium with free entty in the labor market consists of wage 
func tions w~, w~r , w~"-, w~r, w~"·, w~"-, exogenously specified bargaining weights (4) for the 
worker and the.firm, and a quadruple (a·, o·, u·, F~) satisfying the following conditions: (i) 
Nash bargaining; {ii) Unrestricted entry.for firms: 11 ~ = O; and (iii) Steady-Stale: a· .u· = 
()° .F,; = µf\l (U , F~). The equilibrium in this case requires additional restrictions that ensure 
that a!! the agents participate in 1he labor markel i.e. J~ > /3 (6lh + [l - 6] l1) , J:1• > l1, 
J.s/1 > l ;sr > l ]uh · l d f "' l • o la' • o ·I 1 o > la Cl/1 • 0 > I 
The Steady-State Matching Condition is the same as the Baseline case. 
(3 .4) 
Note that the steady-state matching cond ition is identical to equation (6). Thus the SS locus 
wh ich is downward sloping is same as the base line case and does riot shift. 
In the True Retirement case, firms choose to enter the labor market in order to search 
for an employee and continue to do so until all profit opportunities from new jobs are driven 
to zero. Thus the equilibrium entry condition for the True Retirement case simpli fies to 
a = 8 ily [ ( p - h - Wy) ..!.. {3 ( 1 - b) ( 1 - 6) ~ ] 
e_ [p - h .• bt,, l e·-[p- h ozh 1 + u ---- + l l ----s 2 2 ° 2 2 
This is analogous to equation (2.8) except for the first term which in the base line case was 
Biiy[(p - h - wy ) + f3 (l - b) ~]. Ho lding a and() constant. fewerfinns enter the labor market 
in the True Retirement case. In the True Retirement case, profits accruing to each firm are 
lower compared to the Baseline case. This implies that in equilibrium fewer firms enter the 
labor market until all the profits are driven to zero. Thus the labor market will be tighter 
vis-a-vis the Baseline case. The EE locus shills upwards( Figure 3) relative to the Baseline 
case. 
The equilibrium wages of a young worker are therefore 
w = (p - h) - {3s( l - b) - a (1 - b) olh (~) 
y 2 2 µ 2 2 
- ~ ( f3bet ( P ~ hs)) + ~ ( {3a ( P ; h) ) 
Recall that the difference in the wages between the two cases was only driven by the difference 
in profits. In equi librium when the profits are zero, the wage function of a young worker in the 
l\\'O cases is identical. The wages will difft::r due lo differences in the equilibrium values of a, 
the probability with which a worker gets matched with a firm . 
Substituting the wages o f a young \VOrker and the expressions for the fraction of 
each type of unemployed in the equilibrium entry conJition gi\'es the following closed form 
expression for o:, the probability of a worker getting matched with a firm 
2 (p- h) +/3( 1 - b) (s + p(l -6))- 8l1, - ~~ 
Q = (1 + ~) { (p- h - fil1i) - b(p - h., - blh )} - ~a (1- b) (3.5) 
Ceteris paribus, a ~ > a· TI1ere fore. the effect of the withdrawal of the old employed high 
types on the aggregate labor market is adverse. It lowers the probability with "' hich a worker 
gets matched with a firm. The job durability is lower in the True Retirement case and hence 
fe,ver firms post their vacancies. This is because a lo\\ er job durability decreases the profits 
earned by each firm. Given the matching technology, this in tum decreases a . 
3.3 N umerical Experiment in th e True Reti rement Case 
This section illustrates a benchmark example for the True Retirement case given a set 
of parameters. The resu lts of this benchmark example are compared to that of the Baseline 
case, high lighting the effect on the aggregate labor market of the withdrawal of old employed 
workers with high preference for leisure. 
Example 2 The parameters of the economy are as follows: f3 = 0.9, s = 0.05, a = 0.2, 
/L = 0.4, </> = 0.5, b = 0.3, p = 1, h = 0.3, h. = 0.21, b = 0.2 and l1t = 0.3. Then, it can be 
easily checked that equations ?? and?? hai·e a unique and economically meaningful solution 
giren by (o . . o·) = (0.379. 0.422). At this equilibrium, w~ = 0.370, w~r = 0.5. w~h· = 
ll.5<15, w0sr = 0.395 Wui.· = 0 5 u,ur = 0 35 1 · = 0 ')''9 J eh' - 0 3 J er - 0 5 Jsh' = , 0 . , J" ·' ' y ·- ' 0 - . ) 0 - . ~ 0 
0 .. 343, .f0'
1 = 0.100, J
0
"1t • = 0.326, J
0
"
1 00 3 l-· 0 --5 -· 0066 -· 03-= . ' Ill = .~/ 'V, = . ' Uo = . 0 ' 
F,1 = O.Ti9, F1 = 0.106, F . = 0. 5 
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In the Baseline case, a:( l - b) o f the matches are durable for two periods. Whereas in 
th e True Retirement case o: (l - b) (1 - 8) of the matches are durable. Lower durability of a 
match in the True Retirement case relative to the baseline case implies that the firms matched 
with employed o ld high types of workers have to incur search costs. If they get matched with 
new hires, they have to incur hiring costs too. These additional costs erode the profi tability 
of each firm and hence fewe r firms enter the labor market. The aggregate effect on the labor 
market is that it lowers the probabili ty with wh ich a worker gets matched with a firm . Th is 
difference in the two cases is explic itly captured in the so lutions of the benchmark example. 
Table 5 gives the resu lts of the benchmark example fo r the True Retirement case. 
When j obs have the same productivity and the search intens ity is fixed, the critical 
variable to j ob creation is determined by the profit maximization of fim1s. Ceteris paribus. 
firms make lower profits in the True Retirement case. Therefore, fewer firms enter the market 
search ing fo r workers. This lowers the probabili ty o f a young worker getting matched with 
a firm (a decreases) and increases the probability of a firm getting matched with a worker 
(B increases). The wages of a ll the old workers a re independent of the endogenous variables 
a: and e and therefore are identica l in the two cases. Due to a lower probability of getting 
matched with a firm , a young worker's wage decreases in the True Retirement case relative to 
the Baseline case. This implies that the durability of a match that has implications on firm 's 
profitabi li ty in tum affects th e young worker's wage. A decrease in o: lowers the expected 
lifetime utility o f a ll the workers except for o ld employed workers. The expected utility of the 
o ld employed low type workers is independent of a as these workers do not re-enter the labor 
market in search of jobs. In the True Retirement case, the expected lifetime uti lity of an old 
employed high type worker is the utility he derives from leisure. 
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Given the set of parameters of the benchmark example. like the baseline case, each 
parameter is varied in isolation to see its effoct on the aggregate labor market. The comparative 
static results for the True Retirement case arc in Table 6. 
The direction of change as a resu lt o f the variation the in parameters is identical in the 
two cases, but the magnih1de o f change differs. This is because of the different patterns of 
labor market participation in the two cases. When the hiring costs (h & hs ) change, both the 
directi on and magnitude of change is more or less same in the two cases. The difference in 
magnitude is apparent when parameters affecting leisure are altered. In the True Retirement 
case, the percentage change is tw ice that of the Baseline case when f; (probabi lity of being 
high leisure type) changes and half of the Baseline case when lh (utility from leisure for the 
high types) changes. This is because an increase (decrease) in f; implies that a larger (smaller) 
fraction of the employed old workers withdraw from the labor market. This decreases 
( increases) finn entry which in tum lowers (increases) the probability of a young worker 
getting matched with a firm. When f; changes, this add itiona l effect in the True Retirement 
case, increases the magnitude of change. The withdrawal of the old employed high type of 
workers from the labor market dampens the e ffect of a change in l1i in the True Retirement 
case. This is because, for a (l - b)f; fraction of the population, the change in the utility from 
leisure will mere ly impact an ind ividua l's utility without having any aggregate labor market 
effect. 
3.4 Measure of Welfare 
The expected lifetime utili ty of a young worker (Ju) is the measure of social welfare. 
In the benchmark example in the True Retirement case 1; = 0.289. compared to 1; = 0.324 
in the baseline case. The lower probability of a worker getting matched with a firm reduces 
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rh e overall welfare in the True Retirement case. In this case the labor market is tighter due to 
lov.:er job durabi li ty and hence job creation is lower. Table 7 compares the welfare in the two 
cases when 6 and l,. change 
A decrease (i ncrease) in the utili ty from leisure fo r the hi gh types affects Jy in the 
True Reti reme nt case in two ways. Firstiy. it increases (decreases) the probabil ity of a worker 
getting matched with a firm . Secondly, it decreases (increases) the wage earned by all the old 
workers in equilibrium and a lso lowers the util ity o f an old employed high type of worker. 
The second effect dominates resul ti ng in overall decrease in we lfa re. The percentage change 
in welfare is higher in the True Retirement case relative to the base line case due to direct 
impact of l1i on the expected li fe time utili ty of an old employed high type of worker. In the 
Baseline case, it affects the expected lifetime utili ty of an o ld employed hi gh type of worker 
through changes in his wages. A decrease in 8 on the other hand increases welfare in the 
True Re tirement case but decreases welfare in the Base line case. In the True Retirement case, 
a decrease in 8 apart from decreasing the wage cost of fi rms matched with old high types 
of workers has an additional effect. It a lso implies that more jobs will be durable as fewer 
workers will withdraw from the market. Therefore, the percentage inc rease in a due to a 
decrease in 6 is a lmost twice that o f the Baseline case. In add ition, a decrease in 8 implies that 
with a lower probabili ry an o ld worker will be of high type and thus with lower probability he 
will draw higher wages in the labor market. In the Baseline case this effect dominates lowering 
the overall welfare. In the True Retirement case, the increase a more than compensates for the 
latter effect therefore resulting in an increase in we lfare when 6 decreases. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
This chapler summarizes the results of the earlier chapters and discusses the extensions 
that would be useful in further understand ing the interactions in the labor market. 
The trend in the labor market suggests that there are six important conclusions 
that can be drawn. Firstly, the labor force is getting older. Secondly, an ind ividual 's age 
plays a significant role in determining his labor market starus: emplo}ed, displaced or 
separated and unemployed. Thirdly, labor force partici pation rates of older workers have been 
steadily declining during the post-war period. Fourthly, increasing number of workers are 
citing a preference for leisure as their main motivation for leaving the labor fo rce. Fifthly, 
displacement of the older workers has risen disproportionately in the recent years. Sixthly. 
many public po lic ies «ffect the labor market participation decision of older workers - they 
encourage retirement. 
Given these trends, this study incorporates the life-cycle of workers in a search and 
matching framework. It differentiates between workers mainly through their life-cycle. This 
results in differences in employment histories . In addi tion. older workers have preference over 
leisure which gives them an option outside the labor market. 
A srudy of the Baseline case shows the impact of leisure on the aggregate labor market. 
Leisure affects the bargaining power of older workers. The high leisure type of workers have a 
highl!r bargain ing power implying that firms have to compensate them for their loss in leisure. 
The increased bargaining power of workers in tum affects firm entry as it lowers the profits 
earned by each firm . Therefore, job creation in the labor market is affected by the bargain ing 
power of workers. The True Retirement case. on the other hand high lights the impact of job 
durability on the labor market. With the withdrawal or old employed high type of workers. 
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jobs are less durable compared to the baseline case. Lower job durability therefore affects the 
profits of the firms and results in lower job creation. The main factors affecting the outcomes 
of the labor market are the li fe-cyc le of agents and their bargaining power. These factors affect 
the labor market through the profit maximizing behavior of the firms. Thus the number of 
firms that actual ly participate in the labor market to search for workers depends on the profits 
accruing to each individual firm. The matching function in tum determines the probability 
with which a worker gets marched with a fim1 and the probability with which a firm gets 
matched with a worker. 
In conclusion, the current framework is easily amenable to a study of policy induced 
retirement. This would give useful insigh ts into the impact of these pol icies on the young and 
old workers and the aggregate labor market. There are a few other possibilities of extending 
the model. First, the model could be extended to consider the implications of endogenous 
search effort at each stage of the life-cycle. Such a model may be able to rationalize the 
incidence of long-term unemployment among the old -young workers (due ro the possibility 
of retain ing employment for multiple periods) wi ll have the strongest incentives to search for 
jobs while old workers will devote less effort to job search. Public pension programs will 
intensify these incentives, furthe r exacerbating the incidence of long-tenn unemployment for 
older workers. Second. richer insights into the labor supply decisions of workers at each stage 
o f the life-cyc le can be obtained by incorporating both a labor market participation decision 
and the choice of hours of work. As in Pissarides (200 I), workers and finns will engage in 
Nash bargaining over both wages and hours of work. Incorporating these add itional aspects 
of labor supply will provide additional insights into hours of work over the life-cycle, the 
evolution towards retirement, the transition to part-time work among older workers, and the 
aggregate labor market implications of various work-sharing programs. Another poss ibility 
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will be to further consider the labor market dynamics in our framework. It would be interesting 
to consider how the dynamics of the overlapping generations framework compare to standard 
in finite-horizon models such as in Mortensen ( 1999). It is plausible that endogenous labor 
market participation choices al each stage of the life-cycle will affect aggregate labor market 
outcomes through their imp:icarions for dynam ics. Finally, further work could consider the 
simultaneous interactions between health investment choices by workers and labor marker 
condi tions, as well as training and human capital investment choices at each stage of the 
li fe-cyc le. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Compari on of Baseline case with B&R 
Variable Baseline cas.: 13 & R case 
Cl OAOO 0.41 3 
e· 0.400 0.387 
\\y 0.372 0.380 
eh• 
'\> 0 650 N.A 
el . 
"o 0.50 0.500 
sh • 
"'o 0.5-15 N.A 
sl • 
"o 0.395 0.350 
uh• 
\\0 0.500 N.A 
ul• 
"'o 0.350 0.350 
J~ 0.324 0.298 
1eh • 0 0.650 N.A 
J"'" 0 0.500 0.500 
j •h · 
0 0.3-18 .A 
1sl • 0 0.108 0.095 
Juh• 
0 0.330 N.A 
Ju/. 
0 
0.090 0.095 
r· 0.999 1.06 
F" I 0 I.JO 0. 1-15 
F" u 0.860 0.9 13 
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Table 2: Comparative ta tic for the Baseline case 
0 t l1i lh h, h,,. h h 
Variable 
0. 1 03 () :! OA 0. 189 0.23 1 0.25 0.35 
a: · 0.-109 0.39 1 0.-106 0.394 0.401 0.399 0.41 7 0.383 
() " 0.392 0.409 0394 0.-106 0.399 0.-10 1 0.384 0.41 8 
w~ 0.375 0.369 OT4 0.370 O.Jn 0.373 0.403 0.341 
eh• 
WO 0.650 0.650 0.600 0.700 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 
el· 
WO 0.500 0.500 0.500 0 500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
sh• 
WO 0.545 0.545 0.495 0 595 0.556 0.535 0.545 0.545 
sl• 
W O 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.-105 0.385 0.395 0 395 
uh• 
W O 0.500 0.500 0.450 0.550 0.500 0.500 0.525 0.475 
u l• 
WO 0.350 0.3'0 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.375 0.325 
1· 
y 0.3 13 0.335 03 16 0.331 0.325 O.J23 0.356 0.292 
1eh~ 
0 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 
1el• 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0500 0.500 0.500 0.500 o-oo 
1s h· 
0 
0.350 0.346 OTO 0 427 0 ''") • .> - 0.34.J 0.352 0.3.J.J 
1st ... 0 0. 111 0.10.J 0. 11 0 0 106 0. 113 0.103 0.115 0.101 
J"hc 
0 0.332 0.328 0 25 1 0.409 0.330 0.330 0.344 0.3 17 
Jul .. 
0 0.093 0.087 0.092 0.088 0.090 0.090 0.1 06 0.074 
F" 1.037 0.962 1.025 0.975 l.003 0.996 1.072 0.927 
F" f 0.143 0 137 0. 142 0.138 0 140 0. 140 0. 146 0.13.J 
F' 
II 0.894 () 825 0 8i!3 () 837 0 863 0.856 0.926 0.793 
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Table 3: Comparison of Welfare ' ith B & R case for different set of parameters 
Variable Baseline c:i.se B&R 
b = 0.25 0.3.JO 0.3 17 
b = 0.30 0 J::-1 0.298 
b = 0.35 0.307 0.279 
s = 0.00 0.-106 0380 
s = 0.05 0.32.J 0.298 
s=0. 10 .A. 0.280 
a= 0.191 0.340 0.315 
a= 0.20 0.324 0.298 
a = 0.25 0.252 0.222 
Table 4: Welfare in the Ba eline case under different parameters 
Variable Baseltnc case 
l1i= 0.20 0.3 16 
lh= 030 032-1 
l1t= 0-10 0.33 1 
ti= 0.10 0.313 
8= 0.20 0.32-1 
6= () 30 0335 
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Table 5: Comparison of the True Retirement Case with the Baseline Case 
Vario bk Trut! Retirement case Baseline cnsc 
(\ 0.379 0.400 
() 0..122 0.400 
''y 0.370 0.372 
ch-
WO N.t\. 0.650 
We/' 
0 
0.50 U.50 
vsh" 
\ 0 0.5-15 0.545 
s/' 
WO 0.395 0.395 
wuh " 
0 
0.500 0.500 
,,r 
"o 0.350 0.350 
j y 0.289 0.32-1 
Jch· 
0 
0.300 0.650 
Jel' 
0 0.500 0.500 
1
sh' 
() 
0.3-13 O.J-18 
1sr 0 0. 100 0. 108 
1
uh " 
0 0.326 0.330 
J"r 
0 
0.083 0.090 
F 0.885 0.999 
. 
Ff 0.106 0. 140 
F u 0.779 0 860 
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Table 6: Comparative Statics for the True Retirement case 
a 8 111 l1i h~ hs h h 
Variable 
0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.189 0.231 0 25 0.35 
Cl 0.398 0.360 0.382 0.376 0.380 0.378 0.396 0.362 
e 0.402 0.44-1 0.419 0.425 0.421 0..:123 0.40-1 0.4-12 
WY 0.374 0.36- 0.37:! 0.369 0.370 0.371 0.401 0.339 
eh" 
WO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
el" 
W O 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
wsh " 
0 
0.545 o.-45 0.495 0595 0.556 0.535 0.5-15 0.545 
sl" 
WO 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.405 0.385 0.395 0.395 
w~ h " 0.500 0.500 0.450 0.550 0.500 0.500 0.525 0.475 
wul" 
0 
0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.375 0.325 
Jy 0.295 0.28-1 0.276 0.301 0.290 0.288 0.320 0.259 
Jeh" 
0 
0.300 0.300 0.200 0.400 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
1er 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1slt" 0 0.348 0.338 0.263 0.423 0.347 0.339 0.347 0.339 
Jsl' 
Q 0.107 0.092 0.101 0.099 0.104 0.095 0. 106 0.093 
J"h" 
0 0.330 0.322 0.2-15 0.406 0.326 0.326 0.339 0.313 
Jul' 
0 0.089 0.076 O.OR-1 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.098 0.068 
F 0 978 0.797 0.897 0.874 0.889 0.882 0.955 0.8 17 
. 
Ff 0 125 0.088 0.107 0.105 0.106 0.106 0. 111 0.10 1 
F u 0.853 0.708 0.790 0.768 0.782 0.776 0.844 0.715 
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Table 7: Welfare Comparisons under different parameters 
Variable True Retirement case Baseline case 
l1i= 0.20 0.276 0.316 
lh= 0.30 0.289 0.324 
lh= OAO 0.301 0.331 
6= 0.10 0.295 0.313 
6= 0.20 0.289 0.324 
6= 0.30 0.211-1 0.335 
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